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for the observed rating inflation in structured finance markets during the pre-crisis period 
2004-2007. On a policy level, our findings call for a termination of the 'one-size-fits-all' 
approach to the rating methodology for fixed income instruments, requiring an own rating 
methodology for structured finance instruments. 
 
JEL Classification: G21, G28 
Keywords: credit risk, risk transfer, systematic risk 1 Introduction
The securitization of assets was widely seen as one of the big success stories in ¯nancial
markets over the past 15 years, among them mortgage ¯nancing, corporate and retail loans,
credit card debt, auto loans and many other ¯nancial assets. Aggregate market volume and
bank pro¯tability due to structured ¯nance business grew rapidly. For the US, the share of
securitized loans in all loans (including consumer loans and mortgage loans) rose from below
20% in the mid-1970 to more than 50% in 2005 (Brender and Pisani, 2009, p. 6). For example,
in the market for subprime loans, volume expanded from $100 billion in 1998 to $1,200 billion
in 2006, two thirds of which were securitized (op.cit. p. 80). Moreover, through securitization
tranches, European ¯nancial institutions are reported to hold more than 30% of outstanding
US subprime debt.
Since the onset of the credit crisis, in mid-2007, analysts, politicians and researchers
grapple to understand why such a disaster was possible, in spite of then existing liquid and
seemingly e±cient markets. There were also a larger number of sophisticated investment
bankers, fund managers and central bankers than ever before who were equally caught by
surprise.
Due to the high level of complexity that characterizes structured ¯nance instruments,
investors are e®ectively barred from carrying out any serious due diligence exercise directly
(see Gorton, 2008, and Brunnermeier, 2008, for a description of the complexity of structured
instruments). Thus, delegated monitoring is a sine qua non in structured ¯nance markets,
and the major line of delegation in ABS markets relies on rating agencies.
Ratings are used almost universally by investors, bankers, supervisors, and regulators as
the relevant risk metric. The familiarity of markets with these letter ratings has probably
encouraged investors to add these instruments to their portfolios, and has helped to establish
the market for various ABS products in the ¯rst place. While it was widely known that
securitization notes represent tranches, rather than shares, of underlying asset portfolios,
most investors were con¯dent that letter ratings (e.g. AAA, AA, A and so on) had the same
meaning for ABS notes and for corporate bonds. Consistent with this claim, we have not
found a publication of any of the three leading agencies, explaining whether and how ABS
ratings di®er in content from those used in bond markets. Apparently, market participants,
both investors and originators, tended to believe that their bond market experience and the
rating methodology, known for a very long time, could safely be carried over to the markets
for asset backed securities. In an analogous manner, supervisors put great emphasis on agency
ratings when assessing the risk level of portfolios containing such asset backed instruments.
The most prominent example is the external ratings based approach in the Basel 2 regulatory
framework.
In this paper, we analyze the risk properties of ABS notes, by relying on a standard (plain
vanilla) collateralized debt obligation (CDO). Do ABS instruments have speci¯c stochastic
properties, concerning expected loss, and therefore particular risk properties, distinct from
2those of corporate bonds? For instance, how sensitive is expected loss to changes in corre-
lations among underlying assets? What is the e®ect of a downgrade in the underlying asset
quality on expected loss, loss given default and default probability of a structured instrument?
Furthermore, how is systematic risk allocated to the junior and senior layers of a structured
transaction? Finally, how do the results obtained for structured ¯nance products compare to
the risks of bonds with the same rating?
We use a macro-factor model driving the performance of the underlying loan portfolio and
consequently also the associated tranches. This allows us to trace the allocation of systematic
risk to tranches. We propose a measure to estimate macro-factor dependency of the individual
tranches. In particular, total portfolio losses are decomposed in a two-dimensional way to
states and tranches, where states are de¯ned as the macro factor taking values in certain
ranges. Thus, using Monte Carlo simulations, this metric yields state- and tranche-dependent
loss statistics. Our methodology also allows to analyze the impact of model risk, represented
by di®ering risk properties of the underlying asset portfolio, and to delineate its e®ect on the
risk properties of the instruments.
Our analysis generalizes to a wide class of structured ¯nance instruments. Its results lead
to a number of important insights. First, we conclude from the analysis that carrying over
the rating methodology from corporate bonds to ABS instruments results in debt instruments
having very distinct risk properties, despite showing the same rating. The distinctness of bond
and ABS risk properties helps to explain the puzzling fact that many investors in ABS have lost
large amounts of money during the current credit crisis, despite having invested in apparently
low risk instruments. Second, our analysis can be used to formulate the requirements for an
appropriate rating methodology for structured ¯nance instruments.
Related papers treat the issue of risk allocation to tranches in the context of pricing
studies. Coval et al. (2007), for example, ¯nd that investors in senior tranche notes are
greatly underpaid for the (high) level of systematic risk inherent in these securities. They
also consider junior tranches to be exposed primarily to diversi¯able risk which, according
to the authors, renders the common characterization of equity tranches as "toxic waste"
obsolete. Du±e (2007), on the other hand, claims that junior-tranche prices are vulnerable to
macroeconomic performance, and Eckner (2007) ¯nds the compensation per unit of expected
loss for senior tranche investors to be much higher than that of junior tranche investors. Our
¯ndings are consistent with these empirical observations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes how we model CDOs
as a general class of securitization instruments. The model setup is presented and the imple-
mentation based on Monte Carlo simulation is discussed. Section 3 covers the risk allocation
to the individual tranches, both with respect to the overall risk pro¯le, tranche interdepen-
dencies, and systematic risk of tranches. In this section, we establish a base case, describe
individual tranche characteristics, provide robustness checks, and compare the results for the
tranches with the properties of straight bonds. Section 4 looks at various types of shocks
to the reference portfolio and explores, how they impact the risk characteristics of tranches.
3Section 5 concludes and discusses implications of the ¯ndings for investors, regulators, and
rating agencies.
2 Modeling CDOs
This section focusses on analyzing the risk characteristics of CDOs and related ¯nancial
instruments1. We construct a simple tool that allows us to portray the loss distribution of
asset portfolios, and of any tranche that is derived from the same underlying portfolio.
2.1 Model Setup
We apply a ¯rm-value model to capture the occurrence of obligor default. More precisely,
we apply a structural one-factor correlated default model as in Vasicek (1987). The driving
factor is a market factor, and company value is modeled as the interplay of the market factor
and a company speci¯c, idiosyncratic risk factor. This market model approach is the model of
choice in most corporate ¯nance applications. We model company value Vn;t of each obligor
n 2 1;2;:::;N at any time t before maturity as being driven by a generalized macroeconomic
factor Y M
t that is common to all securities, and an idiosyncratic component ²n;t:
Vn;t =
q
½M
n Y M
t +
q
(1 ¡ ½M
n )²n;t (1)
with Y M
t » ©(0;1) and ²n;t » ©(0;1), where ©(0;1) denotes the standard normal dis-
tribution. Thereby, we obtain correlated asset values of obligors. In case the sensitivities
p
½M
n of ¯rm values to the macroeconomic risk factor are the same for all obligors n, then ½M
n
corresponds to the mutual correlation coe±cient for all assets.
Obligor n is assumed to default if at any time t the value Vn;t of its assets lies below
the exogenously given default boundary Dn, i.e. Vn;t < Dn. Vn;t is assumed to be normally
distributed and is standardized such that Vn;t » ©(0;1).
There is a simple relation linking every default boundary Dn to a particular default prob-
ability pn:
Dn = ©¡1(pn): (2)
Usually, a fraction of the notional amount can be recovered in case of default. Let Ãn
denote the recovery rate and µn the exposure size of security n. Portfolio loss is given as the
sum of individual loan losses. We de¯ne the portfolio loss rate PLR as the ¯nal value at
maturity of portfolio loss divided by the ¯nal value of all promised payments until maturity:
1Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) are structured ¯nancial instruments that exhibit two basic fea-
tures: the pooling of underlying ¯nancial claims, and their tranching into a set of bonds, di®erentiated by the
degree of subordination. Thus, the tranches represent claims of di®erent seniority on a reference portfolio.
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PN
n=1 µn ¢ (Fn + Cn;0;Tn)
; (3)
where 1fTn>¿ng is an indicator function taking the value one if security n defaults during
its lifetime and zero otherwise. Tn represents maturity of security n, and tn is the time of
default. Fn denotes the redemption value and Cn;sn;tn represents the present value at time
tn of all coupon payments for security n paid in the time interval [sn;tn]. All payo®s are
discounted with interest rate r.
The applied ¯rm value model (Eq. 1) is suitable for a simulation exercise.
2.2 Model Implementation
In the implementation, we do not need to apply simplifying assumptions to determine the loss
distribution of the underlying portfolio. Instead, we are able to fully pro¯t from the Monte
Carlo Simulation procedure. Analytical approaches often rely on limiting assumptions, e.g.
that the portfolio is composed of an in¯nite number of securities with identical characteristics.
Thus, analytical models to some extent may be suitable for sensitivity analyses, but Monte
Carlo Simulation is more appropriate for real-world applications. All individual securities
in the portfolio can be accounted for by their speci¯c exposure size, recovery rate, default
probability, and maturity. Furthermore, Monte Carlo Simulation allows to di®erentiate be-
tween obligors and individual securities. The occurrence of joint obligor defaults is modeled
by accounting for the sensitivity of each individual obligor to the common factor.
The loss distribution is simulated in 5 steps: First, a realization of the macro factor is
simulated until maturity. Subsequently, default scenarios are generated for all individual
obligors in the portfolio. Default occurs, if the simulated ¯rm value of an obligor, based on
realizations of the macro factor and an idiosyncratic term, falls below the default boundary
which is determined by the default probability of the obligor. In the third step, individual
loan losses are obtained by applying a recovery rate to loan default. Fourth, portfolio loss is
given as the sum of realized individual loan losses. This corresponds to one realization in the
simulation. Fifth, many simulation runs yield the loss distribution of the entire portfolio.
The loss distribution depends on various input factors that may be grouped into three
categories: Individual loan components, portfolio components, and additional CDO features.
Individual loan components comprise maturity, credit quality, and credit migration probabil-
ity, and expected recovery rate at default. Portfolio components comprise the sensitivities
of the individual loans to the common factor, portfolio diversi¯cation, and individual obligor
concentration. Furthermore, in practice, CDO loan portfolios present additional complica-
tions as they are dynamic portfolios with various restrictions concerning asset replenishment
over the lifetime of the issue. The implementation applied in this paper accounts for single
issuer default as well as portfolio characteristics, which are the focus of the investigation.
53 Risk Allocation to Tranches
3.1 Individual Tranche Characteristics
We now investigate the nature of risk transfer from the underlying portfolio to tranches.
This is at the heart of structured ¯nance transactions, i.e. the pooling and reallocation of
individual risks to investors. The transfer of risks is non-proportional, due to the princi-
ple of subordination of tranches. The resulting risk allocation is estimated by Monte Carlo
simulation.
Let us consider as base case a reference portfolio with 10'000 loans. All securities have the
same characteristics: They are zero bonds with identical nominal value, 10 years to maturity,
7.63% default probability, 24.15% recovery rate, and identical exposure to the macro factor,
corresponding to a correlation of ½M
n = 0:15 between all securities. The applied default
probability corresponds to a Baa-rating for the bonds, according to Moody's (2005), Exhibit
17. Overall, the base case represents a realistic setting for a typical CDO transaction. The
high number of loans is chosen intentionally to eliminate diversi¯able risk to a large extent,
giving a clear picture of systematic risk in the analysis as shown later. The evolution of
individual-loan credit quality over time is simulated with 500'000 simulation runs.
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the obtained loss distribution for the reference portfolio. The
loss rate distribution has a typical shape for portfolios subject to credit risk, displaying a
substantial positive skewness. The two main parameters determining the shape of the loss
rate distribution are the default probability net of the recovery rate and the sensitivity of
the individual loans to the macro factor. The higher the macro factor sensitivity, the more
probability mass is shifted from the middle of the distribution to the tails, and vice versa.
Subsequently, following industry practice in the securitization market, the portfolio is
split into several tranches of strict subordination. In the subsequent analysis, the number
of tranches is assumed to be seven. Note that all results reported below remain essentially
unchanged if the number of tranches is smaller or larger, say 5 or 9. In practice, the tranches
are associated with di®erent ratings by rating agencies. For given maturities of the tranches,
the ratings in turn correspond to speci¯c default probabilities. We de¯ne the tranches by a
maximum default probability, which is ¯xed at the 1.01%, 2.57%, 3.22%, 7.63%, 19%, and
36.51% quantile of the loss rate distribution. These numbers correspond to the average issuer-
weighted cumulative default rates by whole letter rating for the period from 1920 to 2004 as
reported by Moody's (2005). Thus, the six most senior tranches are rated Aaa, Aa, A, Baa,
Ba, and B according to Moody's rating scheme, while the remaining ¯rst loss piece is not
rated. We number the tranches from 1 to 7, with the seventh tranche being the ¯rst loss
piece, or equity piece, which covers the residual loss. Tranche no.1, at the other end of the
spectrum, refers to the most senior tranche. All remaining tranches, nos. 2-6, are mezzanine
tranches.
Tranching is done with the intention of maximizing the size of each tranche except the
¯rst loss piece, subject to the restrictions that the sizes of all more senior tranches are maxi-
6mized and the default probability of that tranche is not greater than that required to obtain
a particular credit rating. Thus, a portfolio is tranched by ¯rst determining the lower at-
tachment points of all tranches. The lower attachment point of each tranche is given as the
portfolio loss rate that is exceeded only with the default probability allowed for that tranche.
Since the upper attachment point of a tranche is identical to the lower attachment point of
the next senior tranche, the size of each tranche is given as the di®erence between the two
attachment points of that tranche. Thus, the number of di®erent layers (tranches) and their
required maximum default probabilities, determined by the rating a tranche is supposed to
have, determine the attachment points and, correspondingly, the sizes of the tranches.
Applying the presented loss distribution of the total portfolio leads to the following tranche
sizes, represented as fraction of the total portfolio, starting from the most senior tranche:
0.7853, 0.0385, 0.0092, 0.0371, 0.0397, 0.0295, and 0.0607 for the equity piece. The detailed
summary statistics for the tranches are provided in Panel A of Table 1. Graphical represen-
tations of the loss distributions for di®erent tranches (senior tranche, mezzanine tranche, and
¯rst loss piece) are given in Figure 1.
As can be seen in Panel A of Table 1, the senior tranche is by far the largest part of the
entire transaction, making up 78.53% of the transaction. The expected loss rate is only 5
basis points, while expected loss given a default event is 495 basis points. The mean loss rate
is monotonic increasing in the degree of subordination. Its maximum value is 69.01% for the
equity piece. The default probability of the equity piece is 100%, as none out of 500'000 runs
in the simulation came out with a zero loss rate for the entire portfolio.
The senior tranche has the highest quality in all categories. The probability of default
is lowest, with no loss in 98.99% of all cases in this example. In addition, mean loss, loss
standard deviation, and loss given default are lowest among all tranches. Furthermore, the
senior tranche is by far the largest of all tranches, with a claim on 78.53% of the volume of
the underlying portfolio in the base case. In contrast to the senior tranche, the ¯rst loss piece
su®ers a loss rate of 100% with a large probability of 36.51%. Furthermore, while low losses
occur at low frequency, higher losses occur with an increasing likelihood, peaking at a loss of
36% in the base case. Overall, the ¯rst loss piece (FLP) has the highest expected loss of all
tranches.
The numbers for the senior tranche are particularly striking, as they show a very low mean
loss given default, despite its large size. Panel D in Figure 1 explains why this is the case.
Realized portfolio losses that surpass the capacities of the more subordinate tranches cluster
at the low end of possible loss rates, without any observation exceeding a 40% loss rate in
the simulation runs. Clearly, the shape of the loss distribution for this tranche (as for the
other tranches as well) depends on the shape of the total portfolio loss distribution and the
applied tranching scheme. However, the di®erences are typically not very pronounced and
a®ect characteristics such as the steepness of the distribution.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the most senior mezzanine tranche, no. 2, displays a broad
tendency of a downward sloping distribution function throughout its domain. The loss rate
7distributions of all mezzanine tranches have a similar shape. They are slightly downward
sloping as long as the lower cut-o® value is larger than the mode of the loss rate distribution
of the total portfolio. This is the case in essentially all practically relevant cases since the
mode of the loss rate distribution typically lies in the domain of the ¯rst loss piece.
The distribution of the ¯rst loss piece, depicted in Figure 1, is single peaked in the interior
of its domain, abstracting from the spike at its upper boundary. This follows from the fact
that the lowest tranche comprises about two thirds of the cumulative loss rate distribution,
comprising the peak of the aggregate loss rate distribution.
Overall, the obtained results for the base case are typical for real-world securitization
transactions. To check the stability of the results, the base case is altered with respect to
three selected key characteristics of the reference portfolio. In particular, the correlation
coe±cient is increased to 0.3, the default probability is increased to 0.19, and the number
of loans in the portfolios is reduced to 100. The resulting tranche statistics obtained when
tranching these portfolios with the same tranching scheme as applied for the base case are
given in Panels B, C, and D of Table 1.
Higher correlation (Panel B) than in the base case leads to a more fat-tailed portfolio loss
distribution while mean loss is not a®ected. More extreme loss realizations lead to smaller sizes
of extreme tranches (tranche no.1 and tranche no.7) and larger sizes of mezzanine tranches.
This can be seen in Panel B. In Panel C, the default probability is increased from 0.0763 to
0.19, corresponding to a one notch downgrade, from Baa to Ba, according to Moody's tables.
Increased default probability directly a®ects the mean loss of the reference portfolio and it
also leads to increased mean loss of all the tranches compared to the base case. Decreasing
the number of loans in the reference portfolio, as shown in Panel D, does not systematically
change the results compared to the base case.
Overall, we ¯nd the results in the base case to be robust with respect to changes of the
portfolio characteristics. While, of course, the numbers do change, the qualitative ¯ndings
are unchanged.
From the simulation exercise, we obtain a couple of insights. By tranching, the risks of
the underlying portfolio are allocated in a non-proportional way to the tranches. The loan
portfolio is transformed into several securities with entirely di®erent risk characteristics. The
presented statistics illustrate that reference portfolios of average quality (a 7.63% default
probability over 10 years for all loans, conforming to a Baa rating, according to Moody's) can
be divided into one large tranche of the highest quality, a couple of mezzanine tranches, and
a relatively small ¯rst loss piece in which the major proportion of credit risk is concentrated.
The tranches or only a selection of them, as is often intended, can subsequently be sold to
investors.
83.2 Tranche Interdependencies
In this section, we use the data generated in the simulation exercise in order to investigate the
correlation between tranche cash °ows. The correlation between tranches of di®erent issues is
analyzed, e.g. the correlation between two ¯rst loss pieces, or two senior tranches with distinct
underlying asset portfolios. Since we control the data generating process, we can trace the
e®ect of changes in the underlying asset correlations to the resulting tranche correlations.
Table 2 displays the bilateral correlations of all tranches (ranging from senior tranche to
the ¯rst loss piece) from two di®erent CDOs with identical characteristics. Note that for large
portfolios, the correlation pattern converges in the limit to that of same-issue tranches. The
results indicate that tranches of similar credit quality, or seniority, have higher correlation
values than tranches with di®erent credit quality. Tranche correlations decrease monotoni-
cally with increasing distance of quality between two tranches. The highest correlation values
are obtained for tranches with the same credit quality. These values are close to one. Corre-
spondingly, the lowest bilateral correlation value (0.0729) is obtained for tranche 1, the most
senior tranche, and tranche 7, the most junior tranche. This shows that senior tranches are
almost orthogonal to junior tranches, in particular to the equity piece. Note that even lower
correlations can be attained by increasing the distance of tranches, e.g. by decreasing the
maximum default probability allowed for the senior tranche.
To determine the robustness of the obtained correlation pattern, the input parameters of
the base case are altered. Panel B of Table 2 displays the bilateral tranche correlations of two
di®erent CDOs where the correlation between individual obligors in the reference portfolios
is increased to 0.3. The values of all individual correlations are larger than in the base case.
However, the correlation pattern is very similar to that of Panel A.
In Panel C of Table 2, the default probability is increased from 7.63% to 19%, correspond-
ing to a one-notch downgrade. While individual correlations rise for tranches with similar
credit quality, they decrease for tranches with di®erent credit quality. In addition, lower
rated tranches have a higher correlation with the total reference portfolio and vice versa.
However, the overall correlation pattern is similar to that in Panel A and Panel B.
In an additional robustness check, the number of individual securities in the reference
portfolio is altered. In particular, the reference portfolio is assumed to consist of 100 loans
from di®erent obligors, and the correlation between them is 0.15 as in the base case. The
results are presented in Panel D of Table 2. While the individual correlations are lower than
those in Panel A, again, the correlation pattern is very similar to that of the base case.
According to these simulations, the results con¯rm that portfolio risk is transferred to
tranches in a non-linear way. In particular, the risk associated with senior tranches is only
to a minor extent correlated with the risk of the ¯rst loss piece. Thus, a bank not selling all
tranches but retaining certain tranches will consequently be exposed to certain types of risk,
di®erent from the original risk exposure.
93.3 Estimating the systematic risk of tranches
The objective of the analysis is to trace the macroeconomic-risk exposure of individual
tranches that are structured according to the principle of subordination.
With tranches given by the original tranching process and with simulated realizations
of the macroeconomic risk factor, the dependency of both the underlying portfolio and the
individual tranches to the macro factor can be extracted from the simulation results. The
simulation results allow us to estimate directly the relationship between the macro risk factor
and the realizations of particular tranches of an underlying loan portfolio. The aggregated
numbers are presented in Table 3.
Systematic risk, or macroeconomic-factor-dependent risk, of a security can be represented
by the average loss the security su®ers in a particular state, determined by the macroeconomic
risk factor taking a certain value. Since the macro factor can take any value, there is an
unlimited number of states. For the exposition of the results obtained, all possible states
are aggregated to several broader states, determined by the macro factor taking values in
certain ranges. In order to provide a clear picture, the ranges are determined by the default
probabilities of the tranches. Thus, e.g. range no.1, covering the bad states, represents all
cases with the 1.01% lowest macro factor realizations, range no. 2 represents all cases with
macro factor realizations in the 1.01%-2.57% range, and range no. 7 stands for the highest
63.49% macro factor realizations, corresponding to the good states.
This structural-form representation of systematic risk avoids the linearity assumption
implicit in the more standard covariance, or beta, statistic of systematic risk. The measure
applied here to capture systematic risk is essentially a two-dimensional decomposition of total
reference-portfolio losses by states and tranches.
Note that the ranges, or states, are non-overlapping and add to the total range, consisting
of all macro factor realizations. With seven tranches given, we obtain by de¯nition seven
states of the economy. This particular choice of seven states provides the clearest picture.
This is due to the fact that for each tranche, losses generally only tend to occur if the macro
factor is in a poor state, relative to the attachment point. Thus, the values in the bottom left
of each Panel are zero. This assumes, however, a minor role for idiosyncratic risk involved,
as is the case for large asset portfolios, such as the one in the base case with 10'000 loans.
With more idiosyncratic risk present, as is the case in Panel D with a portfolio of 100 loans,
the picture becomes more blurry and losses increasingly occur if the macro factor is in a good
state, relative to the attachment point.
In Table 3, the average loss for each tranche and the reference portfolio are shown for
the individual states. The average losses are shown both for all states (all realizations of the
macro factor) and for the seven states as described earlier. The entries in Table 3, therefore,
indicate the mean loss of a particular tranche in a particular state. Note that the numbers add
up column-wise for each tranche, line-wise for each state, and altogether to average total loss
of the portfolio (bottom right in each Panel). Thus, Table 3 shows the allocation of portfolio
10risk to the tranches, indicating in which state of the macro factor these losses are occurring.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the allocation of macro-factor-dependent risk for the base case,
introduced earlier. The last row of Panel A shows that the average total portfolio loss of 5.79%
is mainly included in the ¯rst loss piece (4.19%), while the senior tranche only accounts for
0.04%, amounting to 0.68% of total portfolio risk. The last column shows how total portfolio
losses relate to macro-factor realizations.
In particular, the total portfolio (5.79% average loss) consists of 0.26% state-1 loss and
1.97% state-7 loss. As can be seen in the second last row of Panel A, all portfolio losses in
state 7 are borne by the ¯rst loss piece. State-1 losses, on the other hand, are shared almost
equally across all tranches, as tranche no. 1 bears 0.0004 and tranche no. 7 bears 0.0006 of
the total state-1 losses (0.0026). Thus, while the ¯rst loss piece bears losses attributable to
all states, tranche 1 only bears state-1 losses.
Panels B-D of Table 3 provide robustness checks of the results. Again, the portfolio
characteristics are altered with respect to correlation (Panel B), default probability (Panel
C), and number of loans in the portfolio (Panel D). Note that the states are the same as
in the base case. While the process of tranching leads to di®erent tranche sizes than in the
base case, the applied tranching scheme and the default probabilities of the tranches are the
same. Overall, the numbers demonstrate that the basic pattern as discussed for the base case
remains unchanged.
In particular, we ¯nd that, for all variations of the base case, state-7 losses are entirely
covered by the ¯rst loss piece, and the most senior tranche only su®ers in the bad state 1.
Or, to put it di®erently: the senior tranche covers only a certain share of the overall macro
tail risk, and at the same time it does not cover much else besides macro tail risk.
This section has an important result: under quite general assumptions about tranching,
the most subordinate tranche bears most macrofactor-related losses. Furthermore, the results
show that the impact of macro risk on the default rates of tranches varies systematically with
the rating quality of the tranche. According to the results, the more senior a tranche is, the
more likely is its default accompanied by a negative realization of the macro risk factor.
3.4 Comparing systematic tranche risk to the systematic risk of straight
bonds
The last section has analyzed how total systematic portfolio risk is allocated to individual
tranches in a standard stuctured ¯nance transaction. For comparison, we now look at the
macro-factor dependence of non-tranched portfolios consisting of straight bonds with identical
default probabilities and ratings to that of the tranches discussed in the last section.
Panel A in Table 4 relies on Panel A of Table 3. The di®erence is that now, the numbers
are presented as fraction of total security loss over all states, i.e. column-wise they add up to
1, while row-wise they are weighted by number of observations. Panel B has seven portfolios,
each consisting of 10'000 bonds with a given rating, ranging from Aaa to B. Note that the
11underlying portfolio in Panel A corresponds to the Baa-rated portfolio in Panel B.
The results indicate that while the Aaa-rated senior tranche no. 1 su®ers almost all of its
losses in state 1, the untranched Aaa-rated straight-bond portfolio only su®ers 8.25% of its
losses in state 1. In fact, this bond portfolio su®ers losses in all states, even when the macro
factor has intermediate or good realizations. Moreover, all tranches exhibit higher state-1
losses than the bond portfolios with the same rating and lower state-7 losses. Note that the
results for the bonds portfolios are independent of the number of bonds in the portfolio. While
the results just presented are obtained for bond portfolios with 10'000 individual loans each,
the results do not change in the case of portfolios consisting of only one bond each.
These results demonstrate that tranches have completely di®erent risk characteristics com-
pared to straight-bond portfolios with the same default probability or rating. Tranches, es-
pecially the senior ones, are much more exposed to tail risks.
4 Shocks to portfolio and tranche risk
4.1 Risk characteristics of tranches
Having discussed the economics of tranching and the risk properties of tranches, we now
examine how changes in the original setting impact the risks of existing tranches, both in
absolute terms and relative to each other. In particular, we take tranching as given, i.e.
the attachment points of the tranches are ¯xed and the tranches are established as de¯ned
securities, and investigate subsequent shocks to the quality of the reference portfolio. In the
model framework for CDOs applied in this paper, shocks a®ecting the loss rate distribution
of the underlying portfolio can be represented by changes of the default probability and by
changes of correlation.
These shocks may stem from several sources. The default probability may di®er from the
time of tranching because of adverse realizations of the macroeconomic factor, but also simply
because it was misspeci¯ed, e.g. the original rating of the portfolio was false. Furthermore,
the quality of the portfolio, represented by the default probability, may su®er if the loans
are suddenly screened and monitored less well than before. This may happen if the ¯rst
loss piece is sold and the institution responsible for monitoring loses its incentives to ensure
timely repayment of loans. Correlation may di®er from the time of tranching because the
commonality of obligors' asset values increases, possibly due to business reasons.
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of existing tranches for the base case without
shock (Panel A), the case of a correlation shock (Panel B), and the case of a sudden increase
of the default probability (Panel C). Since tranching is taken as given, tranche size remains
constant by de¯nition. A correlation increase has a di®erent e®ect on mean tranche losses.
While mean loss increases for the senior tranches, it decreases for the junior tranches. The
same applies to the default probability and to mean loss given default. In Table 5, the
reversal occurs from tranche no.5 to tranche no.6 for mean loss and default probability, but
12note that the exact turning point depends on the applied tranching scheme. The new default
probabilities in Panel B can be applied to determine the new tranche ratings by applying the
Table provided by Moody's (2005), Exhibit 17. The new ratings are Baa (tranche nos.1-3),
Ba (tranche no.4), B (tranche no.5 and no.6), and tranche no.7 is not rated. The results also
show that the loss standard deviation of all tranches rises. This comes from the fact that
increasing correlation moves probability mass from the middle to the tails of the portfolio
loss rate distribution which naturally also a®ects the individual tranches. Panel C reports the
tranche statistics for increased default probability. The numbers demonstrate that not only
mean loss, default probability, and mean loss given default of the reference portfolio, but also
of all tranches increase. Loss standard deviation, in contrast, increases for senior tranches,
but decreases for junior tranches. Again, the new tranche ratings can be determined as Ba
(tranche no.1), B (tranche no.2 and no.3), while tranche nos.4-7 do not receive a rating.
4.2 Systematic risk of tranches
Having examined the general risk characteristics of tranches after shocks, we now discuss how
the allocation of systematic risk is a®ected by these shocks. Again, we look at a correlation
increase from ½ = 0:15 to ½ = 0:3 and an increase of the default probability to from 0:0763 to
0:19. The results are given in Table 6. Panel A in this Table is identical to Panel A of Table
3, to facilitate comparison.
We discuss the shock to asset correlation ¯rst. As can be seen from the last column in
Panel B, an increase in correlation boosts the losses of the reference portfolio in states 1 to 5,
and it lowers them in states 6 and 7. Since the overall mean-loss change is zero, the discussed
correlation shock leads to a redistribution of risk. The change of state-1 losses (losses in the
bad state, i.e. macro tail risk) is entirely borne by the senior tranche (tranche no.1), thereby
substantially increasing its risk position (from 0.0004 to 0.0018 for state 1).
Furthermore, in contrast to the base case (Panel A of Table 3), tranche 1 now also su®ers
losses in the states 2, 3, and 4. As a result, total tranche-1 losses for all states rise from
0,0004 to 0.0031 in absolute numbers. The last row in Panel B shows that, with constant
total losses for the reference portfolio over all states, senior tranches (tranches 1 to 5 in this
case) bear more losses than in the base case, while the remaining more junior tranches have
less losses than before. Junior tranches apparently bene¯t from a decrease in high-state losses
(high realizations of the macro factor) while the senior tranches are hit disproportionately
by increased low-state losses (bad macroeconomic environment). Also, senior tranches are
generally more a®ected in good states than before.
Panel C of Table 6 presents the results for increased default probability. The numbers
are all equal or higher than in Panel A and show that all tranches are negatively a®ected.
However, the losses are split disproportionately to the tranches. In general, the higher the
seniority of the trance, the higher is the relative increase of losses. While tranche-7 losses
increase by 39% for all states, tranche-1 losses increase by 2850%. The senior tranches bear
13a higher share of portfolio losses. This applies both to all states combined and individually.
In lower states, all tranches su®er higher losses than before.
The general picture that emerges from these results is as follows: if the initial loss distribu-
tion of the underlying portfolio is changing then, holding the original transaction ¯xed, there
is a strong incremental e®ect on the systematic risk of senior tranches in particular. For both
cases, increases in default probability and increases in correlation of the reference portfolio,
senior tranches experience by far the largest relative change in default expectation. For junior
tranches, in contrast, the relative change in mean loss due to an increase of reference portfolio
mean loss is relatively small, and they can actually bene¯t from an increase in correlation.
Naturally, the results are reversed in the case of a reduction in default probability or
correlation. Then, junior tranches will only have a slight bene¯t, or they will even su®er (if
correlation is falling), while senior tranches will quite generally bene¯t greatly.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the risk properties of multi-layer CDO transactions and investigate
the adequacy of ratings as a measure for the quality of structured ¯nance products. In the
numerical analysis, asset values are generated by a model with both macro economic and
idiosyncratic risk. This setup allows tracing the allocation of asset risk from the underlying
asset portfolio to junior and senior securitization tranches of structured instruments in general.
To capture the macro-factor dependency of individual tranches, a simple metric, the state-
dependent expected loss, is proposed. To this end, total portfolio losses are decomposed by
states and by tranches, where states are de¯ned by a particular range of values of the macro
factor.
The major risk properties of tranches can be summarized as follows. We ¯nd junior and
senior tranches to have very di®erent exposure to the macro factor. The common presumption
that tail risk, i.e. extreme systematic risk, is largely held by senior tranches is shown to be
false. While it is true that senior tranches are bearing but macro tail risk, the reverse is not
true, i.e. the share of macro tail risk borne by senior tranches is actually quite limited.
Corporate bonds, in contrast, irrespective of their rating quality, have substantial expected
loss in all states of the world, not only in extreme tail events. As a consequence, and holding
the rating category constant, tranches and bonds will respond di®erently to a given change in
the underlying macroeconomic risk factor. As a corollary, loss given default is highly tranche-
dependent. LGD is typically large for mezzanine and junior tranches, but small for senior
tranches. In standard rating agency models, however, LGD is assumed to be constant across
rating categories.
Furthermore, we ¯nd the response of tranche risk to a given change in risk of the underlying
asset portfolio to be seniority-dependent. E.g., if the default probability of the underlying
asset portfolio rises unexpectedly, the relative change of expected loss is higher for senior
tranches than for junior tranches. In contrast, if the correlations in the underlying asset pool
14change, then the expected loss of junior and senior tranches move in opposite directions.
These basic results on the allocation of asset risk to securitization tranches may be used,
e.g., to interpret the dramatic fall in value of senior ABS tranches observed during the
2007/2009 ¯nancial crisis. According to the presented model, tranche losses are the con-
sequence of a rise in the underlying portfolio risk, i.e. a negative ¯rst-order shift of its loss
distribution. The rise in asset risk, in turn, may be the consequence of misaligned lending
incentives, as they were experienced in the US subprime lending industry (Gorton 2008). Note
that the existant rating methodology, as applied by Moody's or S&P for instance, did not
account for these incentive problems. Thus, if the risk transfer implied by the securitization of
relationship-speci¯c ¯nancial assets (loans) had altered the loss distribution of the underlying
loan portfolio, and this e®ect was not anticipated at the time of issue, then e®ective tranche
risk exceeds tranche risk according to its initial ratings.
Consider commercial or retail mortgage loans as a class of assets underlying a large share
of all securitizations. As is well recognized in the theoretical literature, the unconditional
sale of the equity piece, the most subordinate tranche, may destroy the long-term monitoring
incentives of the originating bank, thus triggering a process of value degradation as outlined
in the last paragraph (see Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008).
Our ¯ndings show that the ultimate e®ect on tranche risk depends on the layer, i.e. senior
or junior, and the source of the shock, i.e. whether asset correlations or default probabilities
are changing. We observe the strongest increase in systematic risk at the level of the most
senior tranche, typically an AAA tranche. This statement is true for both, increases of
correlations and default probabilities.
What lessons can we draw from these results?
On a policy level, our ¯ndings are relevant to issuers, investors and regulators in the
banking industry. Let us discuss these issues in turn.
First, while we do not intend to augment our analysis by a pricing model, we can make a
prediction concerning CDO-tranche price changes. This is also related to movements in credit
spreads, observed on housing markets during real estate recessions and other occasions of
deteriorating collateral quality. A shift of the underlying default expectation o®ers a possible
explanation for observed spread changes of bonds and tranche notes.
Second, the analysis of risk shifting can be linked to the literature on lending standards
in credit markets. For example, there is an extensive literature on the role of ¯rst loss piece
retention for maintaining proper lending standards (deMarzo 2005; Franke and Krahnen 2007).
Thus, if an originator sells the equity piece of a given transaction, he essentially provokes the
risk distribution to shift, with consequences for tranche spreads, in particular for the senior
tranche.
Third, a rating methodology avoiding the pitfalls described in this paper will have to signal
the exposure to systematic risk, along with default risk.
Finally, the ¯ndings are relevant for regulators and risk management aiming at monitoring
risk transfer from balance sheets to capital markets. This study has demonstrated that risk
15management based on traditional bond ratings applied to structured ¯nance transactions is
not reliable. Corporate ratings, as they are currently in use, exclusively re°ect the default
probability of a given security, and are agnostic about loss given default, and about systematic
risk. An improved measure of rating quality would capture the loss given default of each
tranche, the macro factor sensitivity of each tranche, and the equity retention covenant at
the level of the issue. A suitable industry standard for reporting these features still needs to
be developed, e.g. by relying on an easy-to-understand tra±c light system or a letter-rating
format added to the traditional rating notch.
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17Table 1: Summary statistics for tranches
This table presents summary statistics for the seven tranches, representing claims of strict subordination
on the underlying portfolio. The statistics indicate the allocation of losses of the underlying portfolio to
the individual tranches. The cut-o® values for a particular tranche is determined by the default probability
allowed for that tranche as indicated in the ¯fth column and the default probability allowed for the next
senior tranche. The most junior tranche (tranche number 7) corresponds to the ¯rst loss piece. It bears the
¯rst losses occurring in the portfolio, and only when its capacity is exhausted does the next senior tranche
take on losses. The columns present, from left to right, tranche number, tranche size, mean loss, loss standard
deviation, default probability, and mean loss given default (LGD). The last row of each panel displays the
statistics for the underlying portfolio. In Panel A (base case), the reference portfolio consists of 10'000 zero
bonds, and all of them are assumed to have a default probability of 7.63%, 10 years maturity, 24.15% recovery
rate, and a default correlation of 0.15. The loss distribution is calculated with 500'000 simulations. In Panel
B, the base case is altered and the default correlation is increased to 0.3. Panel C applies the portfolio
characteristics of the base case, except the default probability, which is increased to 19%. In Panel D, the
settings of the base case are applied, with the exception that the number of loans in the reference portfolio is 100.
Panel A: Base case
Tranche size mean loss loss std default prob mean LGD
(Aaa) 1 78.53% 0.05% 0.69% 1.01% 4.95%
2 3.85% 1.68% 11.82% 2.57% 65.47%
3 0.92% 2.88% 16.41% 3.22% 89.54%
4 3.71% 5.12% 20.32% 7.63% 67.04%
5 3.97% 12.47% 30.07% 19.00% 65.61%
6 2.95% 26.79% 40.89% 36.51% 73.37%
(FLP) 7 6.07% 69.01% 31.01% 100.00% 69.01%
Total PF 100.00% 5.79% 4.55% 100.00% 5.79%
Panel B: Di®erent correlation (½ = 0:3)
Tranche size mean loss loss std default prob mean LGD
(Aaa) 1 67.72% 0.10% 1.31% 1.01% 9.80%
2 7.02% 1.69% 11.84% 2.57% 65.66%
3 1.71% 2.88% 16.40% 3.22% 89.45%
4 6.85% 5.11% 20.30% 7.63% 66.93%
5 6.93% 12.39% 29.99% 19.00% 65.19%
6 4.52% 26.57% 40.79% 36.51% 72.76%
(FLP) 7 5.25% 60.11% 37.51% 99.87% 60.19%
Total PF 100.00% 5.80% 6.89% 99.87% 5.81%
Panel C: Di®erent default probability (p=0.19)
Tranche size mean loss loss std default prob mean LGD
(Aaa) 1 61.32% 0.07% 0.93% 1.01% 6.93%
2 4.72% 1.69% 11.86% 2.57% 65.86%
3 1.23% 2.88% 16.40% 3.22% 89.48%
4 5.18% 5.15% 20.39% 7.63% 67.53%
5 6.28% 12.60% 30.22% 19.00% 66.33%
6 5.34% 27.02% 41.00% 36.51% 74.01%
(FLP) 7 15.93% 73.83% 27.27% 100.00% 73.83%
Total PF 100.00% 14.42% 8.22% 100.00% 14.42%
Panel D: Di®erent number of loans (100 loans)
Tranche size mean loss loss std default prob mean LGD
(Aaa) 1 77.24% 0.05% 0.72% 1.01% 5.12%
2 4.55% 1.73% 11.88% 2.57% 67.22%
3 0.76% 3.02% 17.12% 3.22% 93.92%
4 3.79% 5.16% 20.54% 7.63% 67.60%
5 4.55% 12.77% 30.28% 19.00% 67.22%
6 3.04% 27.66% 41.64% 36.51% 75.75%
(FLP) 7 6.07% 66.45% 34.21% 95.18% 69.81%
Total PF 100.00% 5.79% 4.95% 95.18% 6.09%
18Table 2: Bilateral correlations of tranches from two di®erent CDO issues
This table displays the bilateral correlations of loss rates for all tranches from two di®erent CDO issues
ranging from tranche number 1 (most senior tranche) to tranche number 7 (¯rst loss piece). Both CDOs
have similar characteristics. In Panel A (base case), the reference portfolio consists of 10'000 zero bonds,
and all of them are assumed to have a default probability of 7.63%, 10 years maturity, 24.15% recovery rate,
and a default correlation of 0.15. The loss distribution is calculated with 500'000 simulations. In Panel
B, the base case is altered and the default correlation is increased to 0.3. Panel C applies the portfolio
characteristics of the base case, except the default probability, which is increased to 19%. In Panel D, the
settings of the base case are applied, with the exception that the number of loans in the reference portfolio is 100.
Panel A: Base case
CDO 2
CDO 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
(Aaa) 1 0.9957 0.6061 0.4315 0.3400 0.2121 0.1305 0.0729 0.3697
2 0.9925 0.8413 0.6637 0.4141 0.2548 0.1423 0.5440
3 0.9785 0.8187 0.5113 0.3146 0.1757 0.5936
4 0.9935 0.7324 0.4508 0.2517 0.7143
5 0.9948 0.7421 0.4144 0.8341
6 0.9943 0.6549 0.8552
(FLP) 7 0.9961 0.7647
Panel B: Di®erent correlation (½ = 0:3)
CDO 2
CDO 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
(Aaa) 1 0.9982 0.6262 0.4460 0.3515 0.2200 0.1356 0.0801 0.4194
2 0.9971 0.8432 0.6648 0.4161 0.2564 0.1515 0.6077
3 0.9910 0.8193 0.5130 0.3160 0.1868 0.6584
4 0.9976 0.7347 0.4526 0.2676 0.7802
5 0.9980 0.7430 0.4392 0.8737
6 0.9976 0.6927 0.8422
(FLP) 7 0.9977 0.6934
Panel C: Di®erent default probability (p=0.19)
CDO 2
CDO 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
(Aaa) 1 0.9957 0.6243 0.4461 0.3500 0.2179 0.1341 0.0723 0.2915
2 0.9935 0.8442 0.6630 0.4127 0.2540 0.1369 0.4520
3 0.9817 0.8157 0.5081 0.3127 0.1686 0.5068
4 0.9949 0.7306 0.4497 0.2425 0.6336
5 0.9963 0.7422 0.4002 0.7883
6 0.9963 0.6324 0.8626
(FLP) 7 0.9980 0.8375
Panel D: Di®erent number of loans (100 loans)
CDO 2
CDO 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
(Aaa) 1 0.7120 0.5033 0.3803 0.3227 0.2066 0.1252 0.0706 0.3153
2 0.6633 0.5973 0.5689 0.4062 0.2523 0.1426 0.4723
3 0.5925 0.6092 0.4757 0.3053 0.1733 0.5041
4 0.6883 0.6169 0.4259 0.2458 0.6077
5 0.7327 0.6317 0.4037 0.7128
6 0.7137 0.5745 0.7161
(FLP) 7 0.7294 0.6321
19Table 3: Tranche loss in di®erent states
This table displays the loss for each tranche and the underlying portfolio in di®erent states, represented as
ranges of the macroeconomic factor. The losses are shown both for all realizations of the macro factor and
for the macro factor taking values in certain ranges that are given by the attachment points of the tranches.
The tranches range from tranche number 1 (most senior tranche) to tranche number 7 (¯rst loss piece). In
Panel A (base case), the reference portfolio consists of 10'000 zero bonds, and all of them are assumed to
have a default probability of 7.63%, 10 years maturity, 24.15% recovery rate, and a default correlation of
0.15. The loss distribution is calculated with 500'000 simulations. In Panel B, the base case is altered and the
default correlation is increased to 0.3. Panel C applies the portfolio characteristics of the base case, except
the default probability, which is increased to 19%. In Panel D, the settings of the base case are applied, with
the exception that the number of loans in the reference portfolio is 100.
Panel A: Base case
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0026
2 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0030
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0011
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0017 0.0013 0.0027 0.0064
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0033 0.0069 0.0122
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0106 0.0129
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0197 0.0197
All states 0.0004 0.0006 0.0003 0.0019 0.0049 0.0079 0.0419 0.0579
Panel B: Di®erent correlation (½ = 0:3)
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0039
2 0.0000 0.0005 0.0003 0.0011 0.0011 0.0007 0.0008 0.0044
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0016
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0031 0.0020 0.0023 0.0087
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0051 0.0060 0.0144
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0034 0.0092 0.0126
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0124
All states 0.0007 0.0012 0.0005 0.0035 0.0086 0.0120 0.0316 0.0580
Panel C: Di®erent default probability (p=0.19)
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.0004 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0016 0.0043
2 0.0000 0.0003 0.0002 0.0008 0.0010 0.0008 0.0025 0.0056
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0010 0.0022
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0028 0.0024 0.0070 0.0131
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 0.0061 0.0181 0.0273
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043 0.0279 0.0322
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0595 0.0595
All states 0.0004 0.0008 0.0004 0.0027 0.0079 0.0144 0.1176 0.1442
Panel D: Di®erent number of loans (100 loans)
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0006 0.0026
2 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 0.0030
3 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0011
4 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.0017 0.0013 0.0027 0.0064
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0021 0.0029 0.0069 0.0122
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0024 0.0099 0.0129
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0189 0.0198
All states 0.0004 0.0008 0.0002 0.0020 0.0058 0.0084 0.0403 0.0579
20Table 4: Macro factor dependency of tranches versus untranched bond portfolios
This table displays the macro factor dependency of tranches with di®erent ratings compared to macro factor
dependencies of untranched bond portfolios with the same ratings. Macro-factor dependency is represented
as losses occurring in di®erent states, represented as ranges of the macroeconomic factor. The losses are
shown both for all realizations of the macro factor and for the macro factor taking values in certain ranges
that are given by the attachment points of the tranches. The tranches range from tranche number 1 (most
senior tranche) to tranche number 7 (¯rst loss piece). In Panel A (base case), the reference portfolio consists
of 10'000 zero bonds, and all of them are assumed to have a default probability of 7.63%, 10 years maturity,
24.15% recovery rate, and a default correlation of 0.15. The loss distribution is calculated with 500'000
simulations. In Panel B, various portfolios are considered that solely consist of 10'000 bonds with a speci¯c
rating, ranging from Aaa to B and determining the default probability. The applied default probabilities are
1.01% (Aaa), 2.57% (Aa), 3.22% (A), 7.63% (Baa), 19.00% (Ba), and 36.51% (B). All losses are given as
fraction of total losses of the examined tranche/bond portfolio attributable to a particular state. Securities
are given in columns, states are given in rows.
Panel A: Base case
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.9985 0.5992 0.3503 0.1975 0.0810 0.0377 0.0146 0.0442
2 0.0017 0.3985 0.5350 0.3050 0.1251 0.0582 0.0226 0.0519
3 0.0000 0.0025 0.1079 0.1260 0.0521 0.0243 0.0094 0.0192
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0069 0.3698 0.3530 0.1646 0.0639 0.1109
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.3875 0.4236 0.1648 0.2100
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.2906 0.2535 0.2230
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.4711 0.3407
All states 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Panel B: Bond portfolios
PF rating
State Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B
1 0.0825 0.0636 0.0594 0.0442 0.0301 0.0213
2 0.0797 0.0671 0.0640 0.0519 0.0390 0.0298
3 0.0274 0.0238 0.0229 0.0192 0.0150 0.0118
4 0.1445 0.1306 0.1269 0.1109 0.0912 0.0749
5 0.2316 0.2250 0.2226 0.2100 0.1893 0.1680
6 0.2045 0.2151 0.2172 0.2230 0.2231 0.2164
7 0.2298 0.2747 0.2870 0.3407 0.4124 0.4778
All states 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
21Table 5: Summary statistics for existing tranches
This table presents summary statistics for seven existing tranches for the case that characteristics of the
reference portfolio change at any time after the reference portfolio has been split into tranches. The statistics
indicate the allocation of losses of the underlying portfolio to the individual tranches. The most junior tranche
(tranche number 7) corresponds to the ¯rst loss piece. It bears all losses not covered by the other, more
senior, tranches. The columns present, from left to right, the tranche number, the tranche size, mean loss,
loss standard deviation, default probability, and mean loss given default (LGD). The last row of each panel
displays the statistics for the underlying portfolio. Panel A represents the base case as presented in Table 1.
The cut-o® values for a particular tranche is determined by the default probability allowed for that tranche
as indicated in the ¯fth column. Panel B displays the tranche characteristics, taking tranche size as given
according to the base case and subsequently increasing the default correlation to 0.3. Panel C takes tranching
as given and displays the tranche characteristics after default probability rises to 19%.
Panel A: Base case
Tranche size mean loss loss std default prob mean LGD
(Aaa) 1 78.53% 0.05% 0.69% 1.01% 4.95%
2 3.85% 1.68% 11.82% 2.57% 65.47%
3 0.92% 2.88% 16.41% 3.22% 89.54%
4 3.71% 5.12% 20.32% 7.63% 67.04%
5 3.97% 12.47% 30.07% 19.00% 65.61%
6 2.95% 26.79% 40.89% 36.51% 73.37%
(FLP) 7 6.07% 69.01% 31.01% 100.00% 69.01%
Total PF 100.00% 5.79% 4.55% 100.00% 5.79%
Panel B: Increased correlation (½ = 0:3)
Tranche size mean loss loss std default prob mean LGD
(Aaa) 1 78.53% 0.40% 2.61% 4.19% 9.46%
2 3.85% 5.38% 21.58% 6.79% 79.16%
3 0.92% 7.20% 25.59% 7.62% 94.45%
4 3.71% 9.78% 28.37% 12.30% 79.48%
5 3.97% 16.26% 34.89% 21.03% 77.31%
6 2.95% 26.10% 41.78% 32.13% 81.25%
(FLP) 7 6.07% 56.62% 37.57% 99.87% 56.69%
Total PF 100.00% 5.80% 6.89% 99.87% 5.81%
Panel C: Increased default probability (p=0.19)
Tranche size mean loss loss std default prob mean LGD
(Aaa) 1 78.53% 1.50% 4.40% 18.47% 8.13%
2 3.85% 23.89% 40.34% 30.00% 79.64%
3 0.92% 31.69% 45.91% 33.44% 94.76%
4 3.71% 41.27% 46.39% 49.74% 82.98%
5 3.97% 59.96% 45.32% 70.54% 84.99%
6 2.95% 78.40% 37.91% 85.90% 91.27%
(FLP) 7 6.07% 95.65% 13.40% 100.00% 95.65%
Total PF 100.00% 14.42% 8.22% 100.00% 14.42%
22Table 6: Tranche loss in di®erent states for existing tranches
This table presents the losses of the reference portfolio and the individual tranches for the case that the
characteristics of the reference portfolio change at any time after the reference portfolio has been split into
tranches. The loss for each tranche and the underlying portfolio is shown in di®erent states, represented as
ranges of the macroeconomic factor. The losses are shown both for all realizations of the macro factor and for
the macro factor taking values in certain ranges that are given by the attachment points of the tranches. The
tranches range from tranche number 1 (most senior tranche) to tranche number 7 (¯rst loss piece). In Panel
A (base case), the reference portfolio consists of 10'000 zero bonds, and all of them are assumed to have a
default probability of 7.63%, 10 years maturity, 24.15% recovery rate, and a default correlation of 0.15. The
loss distribution is calculated with 500'000 simulations. In Panel B, the base case is altered and the default
correlation is increased to 0.3. Panel C presents the losses for a tranched portfolio as in the base case that
experiences a default probability increase to 19%.
Panel A: Base case
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0026
2 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0030
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0011
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0017 0.0013 0.0027 0.0064
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0033 0.0069 0.0122
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0106 0.0129
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0197 0.0197
All states 0.0004 0.0006 0.0003 0.0019 0.0049 0.0079 0.0419 0.0579
Panel B: Increased correlation (½ = 0:3)
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.0018 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0039
2 0.0011 0.0006 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0044
3 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0016
4 0.0001 0.0008 0.0004 0.0016 0.0018 0.0013 0.0027 0.0087
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0033 0.0034 0.0069 0.0144
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0021 0.0104 0.0126
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0124
All states 0.0031 0.0021 0.0007 0.0036 0.0065 0.0077 0.0344 0.0580
Panel C: Increased default probability (p=0.19)
Tranche
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total PF
1 0.0022 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0043
2 0.0023 0.0006 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 0.0056
3 0.0008 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0022
4 0.0037 0.0017 0.0004 0.0016 0.0018 0.0013 0.0027 0.0131
5 0.0029 0.0044 0.0010 0.0042 0.0045 0.0034 0.0069 0.0273
6 0.0000 0.0019 0.0012 0.0064 0.0070 0.0052 0.0106 0.0322
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0093 0.0124 0.0359 0.0595
All states 0.0118 0.0092 0.0029 0.0153 0.0238 0.0231 0.0581 0.1442
23Figure 1: Loss distribution of tranches
This diagram presents the loss distribution of a loan portfolio (Panel A) and three tranches (Panel B-D) at
maturity. The three tranches depicted are the ¯rst loss piece (Panel B), the most senior mezzanine tranche
(Panel C), and the most senior tranche overall (Panel D). The underlying portfolio consists of 10'000 securities
from di®erent obligors. All securities have the same characteristics: They are zero bonds with 10 years
to maturity, 7.63% default probability, 24.15 % recovery rate, and identical exposure to the macro factor
(½
M
n = 0:15). The evolution of individual-loan credit quality over time is simulated with 500'000 simulation
runs. The horizontal axis shows the loss rate; the vertical axis shows the observed frequency, truncated at 5%,
0.3%, and 0.5% for the three tranches, respectively. There are several values surpassing these thresholds: For
the ¯rst loss piece, 100% loss occurs at a frequency of 36.51%. For the depicted mezzanine tranche, zero loss
occurs at a frequency of 87.43%, and 100% loss occurs at a frequency of 1.01%. For the senior tranche, zero
loss occurs at a frequency of 98.99%.
Panel A: Total portfolio Panel B: First loss piece (tranche 7)
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